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This article analyzes the first amendment right of
condemned prisoners to have their spiritual advisor with
them up to the point of execution. It dives into a brief yet
relevant historical background of the death penalty in the
United States. Then it analyzes the specific protections
awarded to death penalty inmates up to the point of their
executions through R.L.U.I.P.A. At its core, it compares
and contrasts two recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court: Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019) and Murphy v.
Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1111 (2019), in which the Court reached
two different conclusions regarding the matter of a
prisoner's right to a spiritual advisor during execution.
The comparison is made in the light of the Establishment
Clause and Free exercise of religion, as established in the
First Amendment of the Constitution. It concludes that
denying condemned prisoners a right to have their
spiritual advisor with them up to the point of execution is
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a violation of their First Amendment rights, as guaranteed
by the Constitution.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODERN DEATH PENALTY IN THE
UNITED STATES
On April 3, 2015, Anthony Ray Hinton walked out
of the Alabama Death Row Unit after 30 years in a 5x7 cell.
His first words, as his family and friends hugged him
were, "[t]he sun does shine."1 He had been arrested thirty
years ago and charged with two capital murders. He
asserted his innocence through his entire time on death
row. The state prosecutors refused to re-examine the
evidence in the case, despite persuasive and reliable
evidence proving Mr. Hinton’s innocence. Mr. Hinton was
told several times that a ballistic analysis, which would
take about an hour, and would exonerate him from the
crime, would be “a loss of time and taxpayer’s money.”2
Despite the overwhelming evidence brought to the
Alabama courts by Mr. Hinton’s legal team, it was not
until the Supreme Court, by a 9-0 decision reversed the
lower courts and a new trial was granted.3 The Judge then
finally dismissed the charges against him, after the
ballistic report confirmed that the crime bullets did not
match Hinton’s weapon.
Walter McMillian, a black pulpwood worker, spent
six years in the Alabama Death Row unit, charged with
the killing of Ms. Ronda Morrison, a young, white
woman. At the time of the murder, Mr. McMillian was at
a church fry with dozens of witnesses. He was unlawfully
tried with an all-white jury that convicted him to life in
prison without parole. Judge Robert E. Lee Key, overrode
the recommendation of life sentence and imposed the
Anthony Ray Hinton, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
https://eji.org/anthony-ray-hinton-exonerated-from-alabamadeath-row (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
1

2

Id.

3

Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014).
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death penalty. After three years into the appellate process,
the Court concluded that the State suppressed exculpatory
and impeachment evidence that had been requested by
the defense, thus denying the defendant due process of
law.4 He passed away in 2013, just ten years after his
release from death row due to trauma-induced dementia.
“The death penalty is not about whether people
deserve to die for the crimes they commit. The real
question of capital punishment in this country is, do we
deserve to kill?”5 With this striking statement, Bryan
Stevenson, human rights attorney, law professor, and
author, shakes the foundations of anyone who would
listen. He has dedicated his career to fighting racial
inequality in the United States. He was the appellate
attorney of Mr. Ray and Mr. McMillian. The worrisome
similarities in the stories of these two defendants are not
random. They are both black, poor, uneducated and
innocent, in a state where racism has evolved from the
obvious evils of lynching and into the courtrooms. “You
are treated better if you are rich and guilty than if you are
poor and innocent.”6
The death penalty in our country dates back to the
times where we were not yet a country. European settlers
brought this practice with them to the Americas, mainly
from Britain. The first record of an execution in the
colonies dates back to Jamestown in 1608.7 The death
penalty is currently legal in 29 states, and it is instituted at

4

McMillian v. State, 616 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).

Bryan Stevenson, “We need to talk about an injustice,” TED (March
2012),
https://www.ted.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_ab
out_an_injustice/transcript?language=en#t-817040.
5

6

Id.

See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
7
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both federal and state levels.8 There is broad discretion as
to how to apply the death penalty.9 From legislators to
prosecutors, the decision of whether or not to pursue the
death penalty for a specific case is entirely discretionary.10
The Constitution's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
address the possible constitutionality issues that might
arise from the death penalty. The Eighth Amendment
protects against "cruel and unusual punishment."11 The
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment states that no citizen of
the United States shall be "deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law;"12
In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court addressed
the constitutionality of the death penalty.13 The case
combined three black defendants who had been sentenced
to the death penalty for separate crimes of murder and
rape. Two of the three defendants had unusually low I.Q.s
and education. The issue presented in the case was
whether the respective death sentences constituted cruel
and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. In a five to four decision, the
Court determined that in these cases, the death penalty
constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it had
been arbitrarily applied.14 Justice Douglas’ opinion
focused on how the death penalty was being
disproportionately imposed on disadvantaged groups,15
violating the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Brennan and
See Death Penalty Fast Facts, CNN LIBRARY (July 26, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/us/death-penalty-fastfacts/index.html.
8

9

28 C.F.R. § 26.

Ariane M. Schreiber, Note, States that Kill: Discretion and the Death
Penalty—A Worldwide Perspective, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263 (1996).
10

11

U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.

12

U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV.

13

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

14

Id. at 239-40.

15

Id. at 250.
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Justice Marshall argued that the death penalty was
unconstitutional in all cases because it was "excessive and
unnecessary," and it "did not comport with human
dignity."16
The questions raised by this decision are still
lingering today. Studies have found that the modern death
penalty still disproportionally affects disadvantaged
groups, as Justice Douglas remarked. Capital punishment
means, “they without the capital get the punishment.”17
Since 1973 more than 160 people have been exonerated
from death row.18 The so-called 'Bible Belt' region,
composed of the southern states, accounts for over 80% of
all executions.19 This is significant, considering the history
of bigotry and racism that still haunts this part of the
country. In Louisiana, the odds of a death sentence were
97% higher for those whose victims were white than for
those whose victims were black.20 A comprehensive study
of the death penalty in North Carolina found that the odds
of receiving the death sentence rose by 3.5 times among
those defendants whose victims were white.21 In 96% of
states where there have been reviews of race and the death
penalty, there was a pattern of either race-of-victim or
race-of-defendant discrimination, or both.22
16

Id. at 270, 359.

17

Id.

See R.C. Dieter, Abstract (1997)
http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=171560.
18

See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
19

Glenn L. Pierce and Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East
Baton Rouge Parish, 1990-2008, 71 La. L. Rev. (2011).
20

Issac Unah, “Race and the Death Penalty in North Carolina - An
Empirical Analysis: 1993-1997,” DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER (Apr. 16, 2001),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/resources/publications-andtestimony/studies/race-and-the-death-penalty-in-north-carolina.
21

“The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies,
Who Decides,” DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER (June 4, 1998),
22
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Arguments in favor of the death penalty focus on
the determent of crime. However, statistics show that the
south remains the area of the country with the highest
murder rate.23 On average, the death penalty costs about
three times what a non-capital case would, including life
in prison sentences.24 From 2013 to 2017, the United States
was the only country in the American continents to legally
carry out executions.25 The United Nations has harshly
condemned the death penalty and has been leading efforts
to abolish it since it created the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights in 1948, where they consider the abolition
of the death penalty as “a goal for civilized nations.”26
A. HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”27
The First Amendment is, quite possibly, the most
protected right within our Constitution. What makes the
United States a unique country in the world, is our, some
would say, obsession, over individual freedoms.
Individual freedoms are the foundation of the United
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-reports/indepth/the-death-penalty-in-black-and-white-who-lives-who-dieswho-decides.
23

Id.

See “Facts about the Death Penalty,” DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION
CENTER (July 17, 2020)
https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/FactSheet.f1595
023050.pdf
24

“Death Penalty: How many countries still have it?,” B.B.C NEWS
(Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45835584.
25

See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. G.A.O.R., 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
26

27

See generally U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
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States of America. The Constitution is laid out in a way
that clearly demarks those rights and protects them from
the State's over-intrusion that might threaten them. The
First Amendment creates a right for Americans to exercise
their religion freely. It guarantees the freedom to believe
and freedom to act.28 It also creates protections to the
citizens from the State prohibiting the Establishment of
religion through any agent of the government.29 In order
for the government to establish laws that are
discriminatory on their face, upon a challenge, it has the
burden of proving that the discrimination is justified
under strict scrutiny.30 That is, there must be a compelling
government interest that cannot be achieved through any
other means.31 If the law is not discriminatory on its face,
it can still violate the Establishment Clause.32 According to
the Lemon Test, a government action is unconstitutional
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
unless it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) does
not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion.33
Under the Establishment Clause, the government
cannot single out a particular religious sect for special
treatment.34 There are three different approaches to avoid
the Establishment of religion through governmental
action: strict separation, neutrality, and accommodation.35
28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).

31

Id.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (Douglas, J. and Black, J.,
concurring) (1971).
32

33

Id.

Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 509 U.S.
938, [709-710] (1993).
34

Separation of Church and State, THE BOISI CENTER PAPERS ON
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
35
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The strict separation approach is compared to a wall
between church and state, and it was first proposed by
Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams, who believed
religion was better served away from government control.
The neutrality theory which is less widely applied and
focuses on "not utilizing religion as a standard of action or
inaction from a hypothetical, neutral observer point of
view.36 The accommodation theory recognizes the
importance of religion and tries to accommodate its
presence in the government. This theory is the most
widely used in modern jurisprudence, and the one that
can be best applied to the Court’s decisions discussed
herein.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DEATH ROW INMATES
The First Amendment of the Constitution protects
the constituents of the United States against the
Establishment of religion by governmental action and the
prohibition of the free exercise thereof.37 The Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act, which will be
referred to as R.L.U.I.P.A., significantly enhanced
prisoners’ right to religious exercise, above the minimum
provided by the First Amendment.38 Under federal law, a
prison or jail cannot substantially burden a prisoner’s
exercise of religion unless it can demonstrate that it has a
compelling interest that cannot be achieved through any
other less restrictive means.39 Congress defines "religious
https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/boisi/pdf/bc_pa
pers/BCP-ChurchState.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
36

Id.

37

See U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.

Lewis M. Wasserman, John P. Connolly, & Kent R. Kerley, Religious
Liberty in Prisons under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act Following Holt v. Hobbs: An Empirical Analysis, RELIGIONS
(July 7, 2018).
38

See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 2000cc et seq.).
39
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exercise" capaciously to include any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.40 Under R.L.U.I.P.A., the challenging
party bears the initial burden of proving that his religious
exercise is grounded on sincerely held religious belief and
that the government's action substantially burdens his
religious exercise.41
III. THE STORIES
On November 6, 2018, the State of Alabama
scheduled Dominique Ray's execution date for February
7, 2019.42 He had been on death row since 1999 after he
was tried for the rape and murder of 15-year-old-girl,
Tiffany Harville.43 The inmate, through counsel, filed an
emergency stay of execution, on January 28, 2019.44 Under
the state's policy, a Christian prisoner may have a minister
of his faith accompany him into the execution chamber to
say his last rites, but not so for inmates of other faiths.45
Mr. Ray was a devout Muslim and wished to have his
Imam present at the execution chamber to pronounce his
last rites.46
According to the Alabama Department of
Corrections (A.D.O.C.), a death-sentenced inmate is
permitted to meet with their spiritual advisor until shortly
before the inmate is taken to the chamber.47 However, only
the prison Chaplin—a Christian, non-Catholic—is
allowed to be present in the execution chamber during the
40

Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 856 (2015).

4142

U.S.C 2000cc; See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S.
682 (2014).
42

Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019).

43

Ray v. State, 809 So. 2d 875 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).

44

Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661.

45

Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

46

Id. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

47

Id. at 662 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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execution.48 The plaintiff argued that this posed a
violation of the Establishment Clause by preferencing the
Christian religion over other religions. The Eleventh
Circuit concluded that there was a substantial likelihood
that Mr. Ray would succeed on the merits of his claim.49
Mr. Ray also argued that prohibiting the presence of his
Imam at the execution chamber, substantially burdened
his free exercise of religion.50 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court ruled in a 5-4 decision against Mr. Ray.51 He would
be executed as scheduled, without his Imam present. He
was pronounced dead at 10:12 p.m. His Imam was not
allowed to be present. Mr. Ray’s last words at the
execution chamber were an Islamic statement of his faith,
in Arabic.52
Patrick Henry Murphy was scheduled for
execution on March 28, 2019, for the murder of police
officer Aubrey Hawkins on December 24, 2000.53 While in
prison, he became a Pure Land Buddhist.54 He converted
nearly a decade ago and had been visited by a Buddhist
priest, Rev. Hui-Yong Shih, for the past six years.55 In
Texas, like Alabama, any of the prison system chaplains,
but no other cleric may enter the execution chamber with

48

Id.

49

Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 551 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

Ray v. Dunn, 2:19-CV-88-WKW, 2019 WL 418105, at *2 (M.D. Ala.
Feb. 1, 2019).
50

51

Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661 (2019).

Kim Chandler, Dominique Ray, Muslim Inmate, Executed After Appeal
Over Spiritual Adviser Fails, HUFFPOST (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dominique-ray-muslim-inmatesupreme-court-execution_n_5c5cf494e4b0a502ca3401a7.
52

53

Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1478 (2019).

See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 2000cc et seq.).
54

55

Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1479.
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the prisoner.56 Texas has more than 100 chaplains who are
either employees or under contract with the prison
system, but none is a Buddhist priest.57 After failing to
solve the matter through the Texas prison system and
courts, the petitioner files for a stay of execution of the
sentence of death.58 Murphy raised an equal treatment
claim, under the Fourteenth Amendment.59 The Court
granted a stay.60 Five days afterward, Texas changed its
unconstitutional policy, effective immediately.61 Texas
now allows all religious ministers only in the viewing
room and not in the execution room.
These two cases with practically identical issues
were decided within a month of each other. While it might
seem that the decisions were significantly different one
from the other, in reality, neither of them addresses the
issue; they do not provide the appropriate relief that best
protects the prisoner's First Amendments rights. One
decision portrays absolute disregard and inaction, while
the other correctly identifies the matter, but the resolution
far from solves the issue at hand.
A. THE COURT IN DUNN V. RAY
Through a very short and vague majority opinion,
the Court in Dunn v. Ray did not act regarding his petition
to have his Imam present at the execution chamber with
him by simply saying that, it was a last-minute request.62
"Because Ray waited until January 28, 2019, to seek relief,
we grant the State's application to vacate the stay entered
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 1475.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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Circuit."63 The majority did not reach a decision regarding
the matter. Instead, they did not address the issue under
the blanket of lack of timeliness. While the Court has
discretion on whether to review a capital case based on
timeliness, to avoid “dilatory litigation tactics,”64 as Justice
Kagan points out in her descent, this should not be an
issue in this case. Ray brought this case in a timely
manner. The warden denied Ray’s request to have his
Imam by his side on January 23, 2019, and Ray filed his
complaint five days later on January 28. Justice Kagan
rightfully points out that “the relevant statue in Alabama
would not have placed Ray on notice that the prison
would deny his request,”65 as the statute provides that
"both the chaplain of the prison and the inmate's spiritual
adviser of choice may be present at the execution
chamber."66
The statue itself is vague. It makes no distinction
between persons who may be present within the execution
chamber and those who may enter only the viewing
room.67 The statue does not distinguish between a prison’s
employees or non-employees, which is the State’s
reasoning for not allowing Mr. Ray’s Imam to be present
at the execution chamber. The Alabama statute reads:
(a) The following persons may be present at an
execution and none other:
...
(4) The spiritual advisor of the condemned.
(5) The Chaplain of Holman Prison.68

63

Id.

64

Murphy, 139 S. Ct. at 1478.

65

Id.

66

Ala. Code § 15-18-83(a) (2018).

67

Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

68

Ala. Code § 15-18-8.
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Mr. Ray timely requested to the execution warden three
accommodations based on his religious beliefs, all of
which were denied.69 The first, that his spiritual advisor be
present with him at the execution chamber.70 The second
request, that the Christian Chaplain not be present during
the execution.71 The third request, that no autopsy be
performed on his body.72 The warden denied the first two
requests, and said he had no power over the third
request.73
The State said in the court filing that the execution
could proceed without the Christian Chaplain in the room.
However, it could not allow Mr. Ray’s spiritual advisor in
its place, because he was not an employee of the prison.74
The code does not reference where exactly a spiritual
advisor other than the Chaplain would be allowed during
the execution. It only mentions that the inmate's spiritual
advisor, other than the Christian Chaplain, may be present
during the execution.75
In practice, a spiritual advisor is to be present as
one of the inmates’ designated execution witnesses, in a
small room behind a large, partially-opaque window to
the inmate’s left, outside the execution chamber,76 not in
place, or next to, the prison’s Christian Chaplain. Once in
the execution chamber, a death-sentenced inmate who
wishes to have physical contact with a religious leader

Ray v. Comm’r, Alabama Dep’t of Corr., 915 F.3d 689, 693 (11th Cir.
2019).
69

70

Id.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 694.

75

Ala. Code § 15-18-8.

Complaint at 51, Burton v. Dunn, 2:19-cv-242-ECM, 2019 WL
6173502 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 4, 2019).
76
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while making a final prayer may only do so with the
prison chaplain.77
The prison's justification for this accommodation,
or lack thereof, is that the Christian Chaplin is an
employee of the prison. A private spiritual advisor may
accompany the inmate to the holding cell to await the final
walk to the chamber.78 However, the State does not let the
private spiritual advisor accompany the inmate into the
execution chamber itself.79 A state-employed chaplain is a
member of the execution team and is usually in the death
chamber during executions.80 The current Chaplain is a
Christian.81 The state has never allowed an inmate's
private spiritual advisor to be inside the chamber during
an execution, regardless of the private spiritual advisor's
religious affiliation.82
The State argued that this policy is justified under
R.L.U.I.P.A. because it has a compelling interest and,
based on the record, it appears that there are no lessrestrictive means of furthering the State's interests.83 These
interests are the “moral obligation to carry out executions
with the degree of seriousness and respect that the stateadministered termination of human life demands.”84 The
state Chaplin is a trained member of the execution team,
who has witnessed dozens of executions, is trained on
how to respond if something goes wrong, and if he
disobeys orders, he would face disciplinary actions.85

77

Ray v. Dunn, 2019 WL 418105, at *2.

78

See Ray v. Dunn, 2019 WL 418105, at *2.

79

Id.

80

Id

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at *4-*5.

Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 230 (3d Cir. 2010); Ray v. Dunn,
2019 WL 418105 at *5.
84

85

Ray v. Dunn, 2019 WL 418105 at *6.
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Understandably, a prisoner's execution is a solemn
moment that must be performed with the utmost
seriousness and respect. Precisely because of the
solemnity and seriousness of death itself is why the
decision of the Court in this case is, as Justice Kagan lays
out in her dissent, "profoundly wrong."86 Her dissent
expresses the frustration about the fact that the Court
simply ignored the issue at hand. She addresses that
while the circuit court thought that there was a
substantial likelihood that the prison’s policy violated
Mr. Ray’s First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court
did not even address this issue, and instead denied relief
on the grounds of timeliness.87
The Supreme Court agreed with the Alabama court
that the prisoner delayed bringing the action.88 Justice
Roberts, delivering the majority opinion of the Court,
granted the State's application to vacate the stay by the
Eleventh Circuit because he waited until January 28, 2019,
to seek relief.89 The Alabama District Court used the same
reasoning in denying the motion for stay. The Court
references that, because he had been on death row for
more than nineteen years, he "reasonably should have
learned that the State allows only members of the
execution team, which previously has included a stateemployed chaplain, inside the execution chamber.”90
The Court’s opinion about this matter shows, if
anything, the disconnection that exists between them and
the realities of inmates like Mr. Ray. While they correctly
point out, that he has had legal representation since at
least 2003,91 this fact does not make his claim less valid or
urgent. The circumstances of legal representation for
86

Dunn, 139 S. Ct. at 661 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

87

Id. at 662.

88

Id. at 661.

89

Id. at 661.

90

Ray v. Dunn, 2:19-CV-88-WKW,2019 WL at *4.

91

Id. at *4.
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prisoners like Mr. Ray are generally, at best, adequate,
both during trial and appeal procedures. Inadequate
representation is the main reason why death penalty cases
are reversed.92 In 2003, the American Bar Association
(ABA), published its revised Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.93
These include requiring the attorneys to have abilities,
expertise, and skills in representing clients in capital cases;
providing two attorneys, an investigator, and a mitigation
specialist in every case, as well as full funding for the
defense.94 According to the ABA, no state has yet
established standards that meet these minimum
requirements.95 Studies conducted in Tennessee revealed
that in one-fourth of capital cases, attorneys offer no
mitigation at trial.96 In Philadelphia, 60 percent of all
capital cases went without proper investigation or an
experienced attorney.97 In Louisiana, death penalty
inmates have faced a waitlist for an attorney since 2017,
due to state budget cuts that led the public defenders’
offices to a depletion of money.98 In Alabama, where Mr.
Ray was tried and executed, it is no different. One study
of four Alabama counties suing contract attorneys
revealed that in 72.5 percent of felony cases the attorney
did not file a single motion, and in 99.4 percent of cases the
attorney did not request the funds for experts or

Inadequate Representation, A.C.L.U.,
https://www.aclu.org/other/inadequate-representation (last
visited August 10, 2020).
92

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id.

Eli Hager, Where the Poor Face the Death Penalty Without a Lawyer,
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 28, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/11/28/where-the-poorface-the-death-penalty-without-a-lawyer.
98
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investigators.99 Unlike every other state with the death
penalty, Alabama does not provide legal assistance to
condemned inmates for preparing and filing
postconviction claims.100
This crisis is worrisome and the issue one of life or
death. Adequate and timely representation for death row
inmates is a luxury. While one cannot correctly point out
that these were Mr. Ray's particular circumstances, it is
unlikely that he received above-average representation
during the entire process, which would substantially
affect the timeliness with which the issues were brought.
Focused on the timeliness, or apparent lack thereof, the
Court ignored the bigger problem. Like Judge W. Keith
Watkins correctly pointed out in the Alabama District
Court Opinion, this case was not about whether the
execution would take place, but about when and who will
be allowed inside the execution chamber.101 This case was
about a condemned man’s right to have an execution no
less "solemn," as the state points out in their response, than
any other inmate before him. He was claiming the rights
that he would have had, had he been Christian instead of
Muslim. The right to say a final prayer and the right to
hold the hand of your spiritual advisor as you die; these
are not extraordinary or burdensome requests. At least, it
had not been before, not when it came from Cristian
inmates. For them, a Chaplain was readily available and
authorized to remain with them inside the execution
chamber and during their passing. However, for any other
inmate, one like Mr. Ray, who practiced a different, and
widely condemned religion in America, it becomes no
longer a right, but an accommodation. According to the
Court’s decisions in these cases, the solemnity of an
inmate’s death is not a compelling interest for the state;
The Crisis of Counsel in Alabama, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Nov. 12,
2019), https://eji.org/alabama-inadequate-counsel-death-penaltycases.
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therefore, the Court may not grant inmates from minority
religions equal protections of the law. Mr. Ray's freedom
of worship right was killed by the Court before he ever
was. So was his integrity as a person and believer of the
Muslim faith.
B. THE CASE FOR AMENDS THAT DID NOT CREATE ANY

Murphy v. Collier was decided about two months
after Ray. Justice Kavanaugh delivers a concurring
opinion that attempts to highlight distinctions between
this case and Ray, and why the Court ruled differently in
this instance.102 The first point Justice Kavanaugh makes
is that Murphy, unlike Ray, made a distinction for equal
protection, and not Establishment. Second, he points out
that if there would have been an equal treatment issue
pointed out, then it would have been resolved, as it was in
this case. Third, he says that Murphy, unlike Ray, raised
the issue in a timely manner.
Texas and Alabama share a similar policy when it
comes to who can be present in the chamber with the
prisoner at the time of execution.103 Mr. Murphy, through
counsel, made several requests to the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice (T.D.C.J.) General Counsel, Collier,
regarding the desire to have his T.D.C.J. approved
spiritual advisor, a Buddhist priest that had visited him
for the past six years, instead of the T.D.C.J. Christian
chaplain who is ordinarily present during the
executions.104 He said that this was necessary to “focus on
the buddha at the time of death . . . .”105 He also requested
for his body not to be moved for seven minutes after the
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execution.106 Five days after submitting his request, he
received a response from T.D.C. General Counsel.107 They
would honor his request of not moving his body for seven
minutes after the execution.108 The Christian Chaplain
would not be present during the execution.109 However,
he was denied the presence of his spiritual advisor in the
execution chamber because he was not an employee of the
prison.110 The counselor of Mr. Murphy then said that he
would be satisfied with any Buddhist chaplain.111 There
was no Buddhist priest employed or contracted by the
Texas prison system, among the over 100 chaplains
employed.112 Mr. Murphy had been a devout Buddhist for
over a decade, and on March 20, 2019, he filed a petition
for Writ of Prohibition in the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals raising two issues: violation of the Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise of religion.113
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Justice Kavanaugh makes a distinction between
the cases based on the claims that were brought to the
Court114:
First, unlike Murphy, Ray did not raise an
equal treatment claim. Ray raised an
Establishment Clause claim to have the
State's Christian chaplain removed from the
execution room. The State of Alabama then
agreed to remove the Christian Chaplin,
thereby mooting the claim. Ray also raised a
R.L.U.I.P.A. claim to have his Muslim
religious minister in the execution room and
not just in the viewing room.115
Both Alabama and Texas policies violate the
Establishment Clause by "preferring one official religious
denomination over another."116 The Texas statute is, on its
face, discriminatory because it only allows for inmates of
two religions, Christians and Muslims, to have their
spiritual advisor present during their execution.117 The
Alabama statute is not on its face discriminatory, as it does
not make a statutory distinction among inmates’ religions.
However, in its application, it does, because the prison
only employs a Christian chaplain.
Justice Kavanaugh then says that the Establishment
Clause issue was resolved in Murphy because, effective
immediately, Texas changed its unconstitutional policy,
and did so immediately.118 Texas now allows all religious
ministers only in the viewing room.119 He says that the
Establishment claim in Ray became moot the moment that
114
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Alabama agreed to remove the Chaplain from the
execution chamber per the prisoner's request; therefore,
the Court had no reason to review his claims.120 The idea
that the Equal Treatment issue was properly resolved in
Murphy shows a profound disconnect from the Court to
the heart of the issue at hand. As Justice Kagan remarks in
her descent in Ray, “[t]he clearest command of the
Establishment Clause, this Court has held, is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another.”121 While Ray could have successfully raised an
Equal Protection claim, there is no doubt that the
Establishment Clause issue was equally present. Had the
Establishment Clause issue been appropriately solved, it
would have also solved the Equal Protection violation, as
it came as a direct consequence of the Establishment clause
violation. The reason that Mr. Ray and Mr. Murphy raised
these claims was not to reduce the rights of other prisoners
but to equalize their own to the level of where others had
been before. Prisoners before have had their legitimate
right of holding the hand of their spiritual advisor before
being executed. Having their spiritual advisor present at
the execution chamber is just a right of dignity that should
not be abridged to everyone but instead extended to those
who could not have it because of discriminating policies.
The Equal Protection of the law should move toward
extending rights and not diminishing them. The Equal
Protection clause was not established to go backward but
forward. It was not established to take away rights in the
name of equality but to grant them.
This moves us toward the next point in Justice
Kavanaugh’s opinion. He referenced that “the State has a
compelling interest in controlling access to the execution
room, which means that an inmate likely cannot prevail
on a R.L.U.I.P.A. or free exercise claim to have a religious
minister in the execution room and not just the viewing
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room."122 In American constitutional law, governmental
actions that infringe fundamental rights must survive
strict judicial scrutiny.123 That is, reviewing courts will
require the government to prove that the infringing action
serves a compelling governmental interest by narrowly
tailored means.124
Holt v. Hobbs125 lays the foundation for the Court's
most recent interpretation of R.L.U.I.P.A. as it applies to
confined inmates. The Court ruled in favor of a prisoner
who requested to be able to grow a short beard, as part of
his practice of the Muslim faith.126 The Arkansas
Department of Correction prohibits its prisoners from
growing beards, with the exception of ¼ inch beards for
inmates with skin conditions, for security purposes. While
he believed that he should not trim his beard at all,
according to his religious practice, he agreed to
compromise to grow a ½ inch beard.127 Prison officials
denied his request, at the reasoning that “the beards
compromised prison safety because they could be used to
hide contraband and because an inmate could quickly
shave his beard to disguise his identity.”128 The
petitioner’s claim was dismissed by the District Court and
Eighth Circuit.129 The Court found that the prohibition to
the inmate constituted a violation of his First Amendment
rights under R.L.U.I.P.A.130
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Holt exemplifies the proper accommodations that
should be made for prisoners under R.L.U.I.P.A. Justice
Kavanaugh does not consider any possible alternatives or
accommodations to the R.L.U.I.P.A. claim. While a
consensus can be made that an execution is a solemn and
serious matter and that there is a compelling government
interest to safeguard the safety of the prisoner, as well as
the integrity of the process, other possible solutions exist.
The main issue that can be spotted in both cases is that the
statutes are vague, and that leaves room for
discriminatory practices.
Justice Alito rightfully points out in his dissent,
“the record in this case is very inadequate to show the
reason for the omission of chaplains of other religions.”131
It does not show what is needed to serve as a chaplain, the
vetting of potential chaplains, general training that
chaplains receive, any special orientation provided to a
chaplain who accompanies a prisoner during the process
of execution or whether there are specific restrictions on
movements or sounds that might interfere with the work
of any of those carrying out the execution.132 These
omissions are critical because they make it harder to
determine what exactly would be a possible solution to
allow a prisoner's spiritual advisor to be present in the
execution chamber. What is clear is that accommodations
could be possible without risking the State's interest in the
prisoner's security and the integrity of the execution
process.
Justice Alito raises the concern that it "is not enough
for a prisoner to assert a claim that would succeed in the
outside world."133 Instead, four factors must be
considered, according to Overton v. Bazzetta134: (1) whether
a prison rule bears a "valid rational connection with a
131
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legitimate government interest"; (2) "whether alternative
means are open to inmates to exercise the asserted right";
(3) "what impact an accommodation of the right would
have on guards, inmates and prison resources"; (4)
"whether there are ready alternatives to the regulation."
We have established through this analysis that, there is a
legitimate government interest. The next steps would be
to explore alternative means to the existing policies, their
impact, and ready alternatives to the existing regulations.
The approach should be a state-by-state approach
that analyzes individual policies and how they need to
change to accommodate inmates of minority religions
adequately. The prisons' policies need to be clear about
who is allowed in the death chamber at the moment of the
execution, as well as requirements to become an
authorized chaplain. Generally, surveys can be conducted
in prisons to help establish a need for chaplains of
different religions who are not currently employed by the
prison. Not all spiritual advisors need to be employed by
the prison. They can be independent contractors who
receive the execution training and are available at request,
as needed. A protocol can be established, clarifying the
precise steps to be taken by each prisoner to have their
request for a specific spiritual advisor available at the time
of their execution. Executions are lengthy, intricate
processes that take years, even decades. It is hard to
believe that with such a timeline, it would be burdensome
to create such accommodations for prisoners.
The final distinction Justice Kavanaugh makes in
his concurrence is that the issue in Murphy was raised in a
timely manner.135 The timeline in Murphy is similar to the
one in Ray. However, in Murphy, the majority said that the
claim was raised in a timely manner. Justice Alito descents
on this specific matter, pointing out that the timeline in
Murphy, if anything, is more dilatory than the timeline in
Ray. In Murphy, the Federal District Court suit was filed
two days before the execution date. Justice Alito raises the
135
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concern that "while these claims are important and may
ultimately be held to have merit . . . they are not simple
and require careful consideration of the interests of both
prisoners and prison."136 He details how the late filing in
Murphy should constitute a dilatory litigation tactic
because the attorney should have been aware of the
execution protocol in Texas, as it has been in place on the
public record since 2012. The alleged R.L.U.I.P.A.
violation then could have been challenged in a timelier
manner as opposed to two days before the execution. In
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Ray, she rightfully points out
that in this case, “the relevant statue would not have
placed Ray on notice that the warden may deny his
request.”137 The timeline issue then bounces back to the
vagueness of the statutes, the lack of consistency in
policies, and the availability of counselors to raise the
claims with anticipation. The bottom line is that one case
unfairly denied review based on grounds consistent with
one who was reviewed by the Court. The Court chose to
focus on possible technicalities to avoid addressing the
issue of the First Amendment violations that existed.
I. CONCLUSION
Both Texas and Alabama statues violate the
Establishment Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and
the Free Exercise Clause. While there is a legitimate,
compelling interest in the safety and integrity of the
execution procedure, accommodations can also be done to
ensure that each prisoner’s First Amendment rights are
intact through the process. It should be a state-by-state
approach that analyzes existing policies, identifies current
existing statutory and practice violations to the inmates’
First Amendment rights within the context of execution,
and creates a detailed protocol that allows for timely,
reasonable accommodations as needed.
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The State should not abridge the right of an
individual to a dignified death. Dedicated to those whose
freedom of worship right was killed before they ever were.
May we do better next time. Let us remember that, the true
measure of our character is how we treat the poor, the
disfavored, the accused, the incarcerated, and the
condemned.138
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